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FOREWORD 
Since the Naval War College was founded in 1884, the study of 
International La'v has been an important part of its curriculum. 
From 1894 to 1900, certain lectures given on International Law to-
gether 'vith the situations studied were compiled and printed, but 
'vith very limited distribution. Commencing in 1901, ho·wever, the 
first formal volume of the Naval vVar College's "Blue Book" series 
'vas published. 
This book represents the fifty-sixth volume in the series as num-
bered for cataloging and reference purposes. The present volume is 
written by Professor Neill H. Alford, Jr. of the University of Vir-
ginia School of La,v, 'vho occupied the Chair of International Law 
at the Naval War College during the 1961-1962 academic year. It is 
considered that Professor Alford's book presents an excellent, infor-
mative, and comprehensive work in the field of economic 'varfare. 
The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the author and 
are not necessarily those of the United States Navy or the Naval War 
College. The fact of publication does not imply endorsement of con-
tent but indicates merely that the subject treated is one 'vhich merits 
attention. 
JOHN T. HAYWARD 
17ice Admiral, U.S. Navy 





1"'he manuscript for this book 'vas commenced in the spring of 1962 
and substantially completed in the fall of 1964. Economic 'varfare 
and its political environ1nent changes rapidly and parts of this book 
·will certainly be obsolete before its publication. Strangely anachro-
nistic references 'vill be found to "Soviet" and "Sino-Soviet Blocs." 
'"fhese may have existed in 1962 but could hardly be said to exist 
today. The book 'vas completed before the United States became 
heavily involved in Vietnam and reflects no substantial part of our 
experience there. The lengthy discussion of economic warfare with 
Cuba through sugar-market controls breaks off in 1962, although 
supervening events tend to bear out the writer's observations. N a-
tional institutions for trade control have altered somewhat since the 
writer described them in Chapter II. All in all, a highly fluid area 
is difficult to write about, although the 'vriter comforts himself 'vith 
the hope that his basic analysis of economic 'varfare, the relation of 
this analysis to legal institutions, and the relation of both to naval 
decision making, may become increasingly relevant as relations be-
tween the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China 
continue their process of change. 
Work on the book was commenced during the administration of 
Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, USN, as President of the Naval 
War College. Admiral Austin's intimate knowledge of naval decision 
making and interest in la'v proved stimulating to the 'vriter during 
his year of Residence. The writer's thanks are also due to Vice 
Admiral Charles L. Melson, USN, and Vice Admiral John T. 
Hayward, USN, Presidents of the Naval War College, who have 
extended him its facilities and have shared infinite patience with his 
delays to which lawyers unfortunately are prone. 
During his tenure at the Naval War College the 'vriter profited 
greatly from his opportunities to discuss and argue points of inter-
national law of naval interest with Commander (now Captain) 
Charles R. Davis, USN, and is heavily indebted to a series of classes 
of officers at the Naval War College bet,veen 1962 and 1965 whose 
international legal problems are reflected in this book. 
The burden of preparing the manuscript for publication and of 
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soliciting comments upon it has :fallen upon Commander Henry S. 
Palau, USN, and Lieutenant Commander Joseph M. Battaglino, 
USN. It is sufficient to say that without their editorial help the book 
would never have been published. 
The materials in substantially the :form presented here were also 
submitted in partial fulfillment o:f the requirements for an advanced 
degree in law at the Yale Law School. In this connection, Professor 
Myres S. McDougal and Dr. B. S. Murty o:f the Yale Law School 
read the original manuscript and made many helpful suggestions. 
Dean Hardy Cross Dillard o:f the University o:f Virginia Law School 
has done much to encourage the ·writer to press :forward with his 
work on this book and to seek its publication. 
Two Elizabeth Al:fords have been extremely patient with the writer 
as the book was in preparation and his gratitude to them is here 
acknowledged. 
Responsibility :for what appears in the book rests entirely upon the 
\vriter. 
University o:f Virginia 
The Law School 
Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable 
Foundation Professor o:f I...~a w 
NEILL H. ALFORD, JR. 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern econo1nic 'varfare is "material resource" ·warfare. Modern 
economic warfare involves intentional disturbances of the flow of 
material resources among people and of the processes by which these 
resources are used to produce values. Under the rubric "modern eco-
nomic warfare" are embraced such apparently disparate practices as 
the preemption of scientific kno,vledge and skill to deny them to an 
adversary and interferences 'vith _ the transport of materials, such as 
nuclear and biological weapons, not regarded as 'vealth in a conven-
tional sense. Traditionally, economic warfare has been associated 
with manipulations of wealth to affect power. But these manipula-
tions are treated in this book as disturbances of processes by "\vhich 
resources are used to produce values through the medium of "\Vealth. 
Modern economic warfare is similar in its major features to eco-
nomic warfare 'vaged in the past. Differences stem from the fact 
that modern economic warfare is waged during a period of general 
military stalemate. This military stalemate is of uncertain duration. 
It is subject to intentional or inadvertent disturbances, being based 
upon a balance between major adversaries in arsenals of ultra-
decisive 'veapons of a nuclear, biological and chemical nature'. 
Thus, when modern economic "\Varfare is '"aged during insurgen-
cies, counterinsurgencies and "limited" 'vars, coercive economic prac-
tices may escalate into violent po,ver exchanges. When this escalation 
is not desired by the policy makers concerned, there is a premium 
upon selecting econon1ic warfare techniques 'vhich reduce the risk 
of escalation to a minimum. 
The writer seeks to demonstrate in Part I of this book that eco-
nomic warfare by "protracted harassment," the usual posture o£ the 
United States· and other major powers when employing economic 
coercion, has been rendered marginally effective, prohibitively costly 
and extremely hazardous by political and technical changes. He 
recommends, as an alternative to economic warfare by "protracted 
harassment," preference for econo1nic 'varfare by "economic sortie." 
Economic warfare by "economic sortie" has been 'vaged frequently 
and effectively in the past. It is adaptable to current "military stale-
mate" conditions whether or not employed concomitantly to limited 
military hostilities. 
In Part II of this book, principles developed and discussed 1n 
1 
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Part I are applied in a series of hypothetical cases in which naval 
officers participate in decision making, often simply in an advisory 
capacity, at various policy levels. The convenience of the casual 
reader has been sacrificed to realism by developing the hypotheticals 
in factual sequence. Consequently, a reader referring to a single 
hypothetical will perhaps find useful a review of the preceding fact 
situation. 
Two islands (logical targets for economic 'varfare by sea) figure 
in the hypotheticals. These are Nueva and Antioka, adjacent and 
fictitious countries, placed in the Western Hemisphere only to involve 
in the discussions the Organization of American States. A map ap-
pears at the beginning of Part II and as Appendix A. 
The situations commence with naval activity relating to a civil 
disturbance in Neuva in 'vhich property of United States citizens is 
threatened with loss. The situations then progress through a civil 
war in Nueva which results in overthro'v of its government by the 
insurgents; strained relations between the new government in Nueva 
and Antioka; development of Nueva as a Scythian satellite, Scythia, 
also a fictitious state, appearing as a major political adversary of the 
United States; overthrow of the Antiokan government by Nueva 
with Scythian aid; and end with a series of hypotheticals in which 
the United States establishes a naval blockade of Antioka and Nueva 
and later participates in peace enforcement action against Antioka 
and Nueva by the Organization of American States under the Rio 
Pact. 
The purpose of the book is to alert naval officers to the bearing of 
la"? upon economic 'varfare confrontations and to demonstrate to 
them how law relates to the discharge of their economic warfare 
duties. No economic warfare primer is attempted, although in con-
centrating upon decision making at low policy levels and in relating 
law to this process, the writer found useful a delineation of major 
principles of strategy and tactics in economic 'varfare. Other com-
mentators, stressing either the use of economic warfare techniques to 
~ support military operations or the impact of economic 'varfare upon 
national economies, have not attempted this emphasis. 
In hammering out his own provisional and crude frame,vork of 
strategy and tactics in economic warfare, the "~Titer is a "Tare he has 
trampled upon niceties of economic theory with Gothic abandon. 
Perhaps those better equipped for the task will recognize the need 
for principles of economic 'varfare to guide executive officers at all 
levels of government and 'vill provide a more 'vorkable and satis-
factory analysis. 
The use of naval power in economic 'varfare is familiar. Admiral 
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Mahan, in his classic The Influence of Sea Po~wer Upon History*** 1 
defined ·with infinite care the relationships bet,veen naval po,ver and 
the distribution and use o£ material resources. Sharing 'vith other 
19th century thinkers the conviction that principles o£ growth, useful 
to explain the past and guide predictions o£ the future, could be dis-
covered by a sophisticated and diligent analysis o£ value processes, 
Mahan related naval power to principles o£ political change discover-
able in processes for producing and using material resources. 
Whether ""~ealth" principles provide complete explanations o£ 
events in the past or sound guidelines for forecasts o£ the future are 
matters no'v hotly disputed. But, in addition to securing deserved 
recognition o£ the influence o£ navies in history, quite apart from 
their sporadic use in war to destroy the people and commerce o£ an 
enemy, Mahan articulated an enduring relationship bet,veen navies 
and the distribution and use o£ material resources. This relationship 
deserves attention 'vhen the United States Navy is considered as a 
force to execute a national policy o£ "graduated response to coercion." 
However, Mahan's advocacy o£ the need for a revival o£ United 
States naval strength, 'v hich had fallen into desuetude in the late 
19th century, led him to define the mission o£ a naval establishment 
primarily as one o£ trade protection. This was a modest demand, 
ably attuned to the trend o£ American thought and the changing 
political position o£ the United States. 
Many Americans o£ Mahan's day questioned the necessity even for 
the feeble fleet then flying our flag. They shared, nevertheless, a 
pervasive belie£ that a major purpose o£ government was positive, 
but benign and unobtrusive, protection o£ private activity in pro-
ducing, transporting and using 'vealth. 
Sensitive to this opinion, and foreseeing a stimulus to American 
interest in sea trade following completion o£ the then contemplated 
Isthmian canal, Mahan accurately and effectively projected an image 
of the Navy as the indispensable protector o£ sea commerce. His argu-
ments supported claims by the Navy to an increasing share o£ the 
national budget during the lean fiscal years preceding the Spanish-
American War and during the period o£ almost equal general mili-
tary impoverishment preceding World War I. Educated by Mahan 
to the intimate relationship bet,veen a powerful Navy and the peace-
ful maintenance and expansion o£ sea commerce, the American tax-
payer bore his increasing financial burden 'vith little complaint. 
Influenced also by Mahan's definition o£ the purpose o£ a United 
States naval establishment, the Navy accepted the strategic and 
tactical concept o£ "organic" operational control advocated by Mahan 
1 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1789 (1890). 
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and a number of his contemporaries. "Organic" ad1ninistrative con-
trol had prevailed in the Navy for many years. But many officers, 
particularly senior officers of Civil War vintage, adhered staunchly 
to the concept that the normal and proper employment of naval 
po-\ver 'vas by the dispatch of individual cruisers for raids upon 
enemy commerce.2 Mahan and others, who vie,ved the mission of the 
Navy principally as one of protecting sea carriers to and from 
American ports, saw centralized operational control as an essential 
institution to accomplish this end. 
By the time of the Spanish-American War the "Mahan concept" 
w·as beginning to prevail. The fla1nboyant individualism of inde-
pendent naval operators, such as Cushing, 'vas on the 'vane. Efficient 
electronic communications sealed the victory of ~'organic" operational 
control. 
Reasonably "'ell-financed, in part at least as an outgro,vth of 
Mahan's effective public appeaJ, the Navy kept abreast of improve-
ments in naval hard,vare. Coupled ·with this "'as adherence to a ne'v 
tactical and strategic concept 'vhich proved effectively geared to the 
requirements of major naval w·arfare in the early 20th century. Dur-
ing World War I, the protection of commerce, as Mahan had fore-
seen, 'vas the dominant mission of the United States Navy; and 
although World War II imposed diverse requirements upon the 
Navy, commerce protection again demanded a significant part of its 
effort. 
The nuclear age has reinforced the importance of "organic" opera-
tional control. But features of existing and potential military con-
fiict in the nuclear age have revived a shadow of the old decentralized 
decision making fan1iliar in the early period of Mahan's naval career. 
The more dramatic aspects of this current individualization of policy 
making inhere in such current naval functions as the use of naval 
units to strike, by means of aircraft or missiles, deep within conti-
nental land masses and the provision of second-strike capabilities by 
units at sea. Yet changes of greater subtlety also are occurring. 
In the past, naval officers have figured in economic 'var£are most 
prominently 'vhile maintaining blockades, enforcing contraband lists 
and preventing unneutral service during general hostilities. During 
World Wars I and II, as " 'ill be pointed out in further detail in 
Chapter V, there 'vas a shift in the responsibility for major economic 
'Yarfare decision n1aking from the sea officer to administrative officers 
ashore. ·The administration of economic ·warfare was centralized and 
an effort was made to apply administrative controls to contraband at 
2 See Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 271 ( 1907). 
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source-or before the contraband was shipped by sea. Under these 
circumstances, the "policy-voices" of naval officers 'vere muted. 
It had al,vays been necessary for naval officers to have some under-
standing of economic warfare other than that immediately involved 
in their sea duties. This requirement exists today. All economic 'var-
fare tends to evolve to,vards defensive or offensive postures by ad-
versaries requiring an interdiction of sea or air transport. The naval 
administrative (NAVAD) blockades of World Wars I and II were 
founded in part upon economic 'varfare postures of the contestants 
antedating military hostilities. While the diverse backgrounds of 
officers on blockade duty during the two great wars did not provide 
an officer corps well versed in general economic warfare techniques, 
the better the grasp by an officer of the administrative framework 
for ~conomic warfare, the more efficiently he performed his duties. 
All economic 'varfare practices tend to interrelate-and effective or 
ineffective action in one zone of economic warfare is likely to be 
reflected in others. 
Yet modern economic warfare, waged during insurgencies, counter-
insurgencies and limited "!ars, is conducted without the major ad-
ministrative structures which have been hastily assembled during the 
two great world conflicts and as hastily demolished at the end of 
them. Although the United States is prepared because of its extensive 
resources to wage economic warfare, it is deficient in economic war-
fare organization and theory. Our greatest neglect in this area has 
been our failure to recognize economic warfare as a coercive practice 
pattern deserving the attention of a permanent corps of professionals. 
Absent such a corps of economic 'varfare professionals, the burden 
to grasp economic ·warfare theory and develop and use economic 
warfare techniques tends to rest heavily upon military officers-and 
particularly upon those in the naval service because of the intimate 
relation between naval po,ver and the transport and use of material 
resources so ably spelled out by Mahan. In none of the other military 
services does the spectrum of decision making responsibility in eco-
nomic warfare range from the situation in which tight central con-
trol leaves little discretion to the commander to the situation in which 
this commander is likely to find an economic warfare decision of the 
greatest national importance resting squarely upon his shoulders-
nor in the other military services do these situations tend to shift 
with equal rapidity. 
Furthermore, the tasks required of naval officers have become re-
markably diverse in the nuclear age. In the time of Mahan, it was 
sufficient for a naval officer in a senior command position to be a good 
seaman and able fighter. Today he may have to serve as a diplomat or 
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political advisor or may perform sundry other tasks having political 
overtones required by the exigencies of a situation. He must under-
stand the entire power structure in which he operates and cannot 
limit his study or inquiry simply to the details of naval administra-
tion and organization. 
It is this new trend back to a form of decentralized decision mak-
ing compatible with "organic" operational control, coupled with the 
increasingly diverse responsibilities which a naval officer is expected 
to discharge, which justifies an emphasis upon "legal strategy" in 
economic warfare at the comparatively low policy level here con-
sidered. In economic warfare which involves naval sea and air power 
only provisionally or peripherally, naval officers, although perhaps 
filling roles less conspicuous than those of civilian officials, may par-
ticipate in economic warfare policy making as advisors even when 
not participating as commanders. 
When one examines the minutiae of an economic warfare trans-
action-and a major effort to do this is made in this book-it is 
apparent that most of the critical decisions-those from which there 
is no turning back-are made at the level of application (or execu-
tion) of economic warfare policy. It is at this point that a naval 
officer is most likely to participate as an advisor or commander. As 
administrators, these officers also engage in administrative or "effec-
tive" lawmaking as they apply their orders to the facts. 
The major responsibility of any military officer, including those in 
the Navy, is to understand and execute legal orders given them by 
their military or civilian commanders. A military officer has no 
license to formulate his o"\vn "law" or to engage in legal experiment. 
But in discharging his professional responsibilities, the officer be-
comes, consciously or not, both a contributor of new legal institutions 
and an assayer of existing legal institutions. As an "administrative 
lawmaker," a naval officer may contribute concretely to developing 
legal doctrines and techniques which take current facts and postu-
lated future facts realistically into account. He may also induce 
, authoritative decision makers to reject legal doctrine that has be-
come irrelevant to contemporary fact. The process by which these 
developments occur is described in greater detail in Chapter I of this 
book. The process is as difficult to escape as it is to describe; although 
to suggest a naval officer may. make new law, rather than simply 
administer laws passed or proclaimed by a constitutional body or 
civilian officer, appears superficially to invite unwarranted breaches 
of the mercurially sensitive lines defining civil-military relationships. 
An understanding by naval officers of the distinctions between 
formal and effective lawmaking functions may sharpen their appre-
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ciation of the importance of impingements of "law" upon economic 
warfare missions. Such an understanding may also dispel any false 
image these officers may entertain of "la·w" as an arbitrary or unrea-
sonable restriction upon imaginative measures in economic warfare. 
While a naval officer's participation in "legal strategy" in economic 
·warfare usually occurs at the administrative or operational level as a 
commander or staff officer, he may participate in formulating eco-
nomic warfare policy, including its legal elements, on a formal basis 
and at a high executive, legislative or judicial echelon. Rarely, he 
will serve as a member of a court or commission dealing with eco-
nomic warfare policy. Perhaps he will be a delegate to an interna-
tional convention dealing 'vith legal issues in economic warfare from 
the perspective of the general _community. Typically, however, his 
participation in economic warfare policy making on a formal level 
will be advisory only. 
Thus, he may have special knowledge concerning some confronta-
tion in which an application of economic warfare techniques is con-
sidered. His advice may then be sought at high executive levels. He 
may testify before a Congressional committee which seeks to define 
an economic 'varfare problem of naval interest and devise legislation 
to deal with it. He may offer testimony before courts. In one rela-
tively recent ·case before the World Court, testimony by naval officers 
(none of them from the United States) had an important bearing 
upon the decision.3 
In his participation in policy making at the various informal and 
formal policy levels 1nentioned, a naval officer deals with both na-
tional and international law. The major obstacle to his effective use 
of "legal strategy" is his tendency to regard national and interna-
tional law simply as net,vorks of rules to regulate conduct. 
For this reason, Chapter I of this book offers a brief survey of the 
participants in economic 'varfare, their objectives and techniques and 
the conditions under which these techniques are e·mployed. Chapter 
II then bears upon claims and counterclaims opposed in economic 
warfare and ·processes by 'vhich con1munity decisions concerning 
these claims and counterclaims are formulated. 
In Chapter II the confrontation bet,veen the United States and 
Cuba concerning elimination of the Cuban sugar quota in the United 
States closed market is used as a framework for discussion. Although 
conflict concerning a sugar quota seems at first glance to have little 
3 The Corfu Channel Case, mentioned at page 371 infra. For a roster of the 
witnesses (British, French, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Bulgarian and Yugo-
slav) and a summary of their testimony, see Alford, "Fact Finding by the 
World Court," 4 Villanova Law Review, 37, 69-74 (1958). 
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relevance to participation by a naval officer in economic 'varfare, it 
facilitates an examination of Communist economic 'varfare tech-
niques with which naval officers are vitally concerned and an exami-
nation also of United States law bearing principally upon "defen-
sive" economic 'varfare. The "sugar encounter" demonstrates how 
coercive economic techniques tend to escalate towards situations re-
quiring naval action and displays the complexity of decision making 
in economic warfare waged by the United States. 
There is no attempt in Part I or in the problems developed in 
Part II to do more than examine "legal strategy" in economic 'var-
fare from the decision-making perspective of a participating United 
States naval officer. Thus, the concentration is upon "claim processes": 
Who are the claimants and counterclaimants in e.conomic coercion? 
What types of claims are asserted? In what conflict situations are 
they asserted? What strategies are emphasized? And what are the 
outcomes? Since legal strategy in economic warfa.re is emphasized, 
there is also concentration upon the processes of "decision" con-
cerning these claims; but no effort is made to view the instrument of 
economic coercion in multiperspective as part of a world social and 
power process. 
Policy statements by decision makers in the general community 
concerning economic 'varfare are quite sparse. It has been difficult in 
the past to generate issues in economic 'varfare 'vhich could be pre-
sented to an organ of the general community for decision. Moreover, 
the economic practices of the United States (coercive and persuasive) 
apparently thus far have been compatible 'vith the demands of the 
general community; although this 'vill not necessarily continue to be 
the case. If divergences occur, and as general community policy is 
gradually formulated in this area, analyses of economic 'varfare from 
a general community perspective, clarifications of general community 
policy and recommendations for alternative policies and procedures 
will become of increasing value. The ground,vork in this book may 
facilitate a more ambitious analysis. 
A multiperspective study, for example, will require the "economic 
instrument of coercion" to be located within the pattern of com-
munity coercive processes. The participants, their immediate and ulti-
mate objectives, the conflict situations, the strategies of the partici-
pants and the effects of these strategies all should be accurately 
defined. The claim processes, as considered in this book, should then 
be examined, with emphasis, ho,vever, not simply upon the role in 
this process of a single type of executive officer, but upon the full 
spectrum of national claims and counterclaims and claims and coun-
terclaims by participants other than states. The process of decision 
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likewise should be examined in detail from the perspective of the 
territorially organized communities and also from the perspectives 
of officials of international organizations and tribunals: their obj ec-
tives; decisional situations; strategies; and the, outcomes of their 
decisions being considered. An analysis in detail, such as this, might 
then pe,rmit a rational clarification of policy for the general com-
munity with alternative policies and procedures suggested in the 
light of current trends and conditions. 
